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ABSTRACT. Drawing its information from different documents in Portuguese and French archives, this article examines the evolution of Portuguese colonial policies regarding Islam, focusing the special case of Mozambique. Such policies evolved from an attitude of neglect and open repression, prevalent in the early years of the colonial war, when Muslims were perceived as main supporters of the anti-colonial guerrilla in northern Mozambique, to a more nuanced approach that tried to isolate ‘African Muslims’ from foreign influences in order to align them with the Portuguese combat against the anti-colonial movement. The article analyses the latter strategy, assessing its successes and failures and the contributions made by several actors that were engaged in this achievement: the Catholic Church, the core of political power and its local ramifications in the colonies.

On 28 April 1954, R. Bogaers, Consul General of France in Lourenço Marques (currently Maputo), sent the Minister for Foreign Affairs a dispatch on a topic that was seemingly not in the frontline of political priorities: Islamism in the Portuguese colony of Mozambique.​[1]​ His main stance on such subject was that Islam did not raise any serious problem locally. Besides the ‘natural factors’ that allegedly hindered the ‘active irradiation’ of that religion in Mozambique, there were also the human ones: the laws, the Catholic clergymen, and the local Portuguese government, whose combined strength were able to ‘bar the external influences’ that could give Islam a ‘greater force of expansion’. 
Bogaers’s report distinguished between three categories of Muslims living in that colony. The first one was composed of ‘native Muslims’, roughly estimated at 600,000, settled predominantly in the northern regions, some of them of Swahili origin and many presenting an already ‘mitigated Islamic faith’ due to the prevailing influence of black elements. This amounted to the famous and then-popular notion of ‘black Islam’, a branch of the Islamic religion that the authors of the French colonial school wrote off as ‘superficial’, ‘ignorant’ and ‘syncretistic’.​[2]​  The other Muslim group that the Consul of France singled out, comprising around 6,000 members, had come mostly from India and Pakistan and were established in Mozambique Island (in the north) and the two main cities: Beira and Lourenço Marques. Among these, the significant Ismaili community was of note. Finally, Muslims from the Comoros Islands formed a third and smaller group, located in the same sites where ‘Asian’ Muslims prevailed. According to Bogaers, the latter were more consistent than the Africans in their beliefs, but also more focused on commercial businesses, preferring to remain on good terms with the Portuguese authorities than to invest their time in a religious proselytism that could alienate them. Therefore, they seemed far from representing a threat to the colonial order in Mozambique. The French Consul concluded with an overall assessment: ‘Too scattered, too few in number and too different to raise a religious problem; too surveilled to create a political problem, the Muslims of Mozambique, thanks to the Indian element, are limited to playing a remarkable commercial role’. 
This document ascribed to the ‘prevalent’ Catholic clergy the main responsibility for putting a check on the spread of Islam in Mozambique, considering that it conducted ‘the only really permanent struggle’ against Islam, the only one that could deliver ‘effective results’. This was in line with the dominant perception among Catholics throughout the 1930s, at least in the opinions voiced by some missionary periodicals, which asserted, without a shred of diffidence, that in the struggle between two civilisations, the Islamic and the Christian, the latter would ‘necessarily’ be the victor.​[3]​ 
And yet, in the 1950s such a view was already being challenged by a growing scepticism. A detailed study of the Islamic presence in Mozambique, written in October 1957 by P. de Beaumont, another French Consul General, pictured the power of Islam in terms much more nuanced than those used by Bogaers, his predecessor.​[4]​ It is quite relevant that this dispatch was a response to the following assignment from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs:

To study, in Mozambique, an Islam that is expanding throughout Africa, to measure its spread, its progress, its sensitivity to foreign influences, its relations to neighbouring countries or the Middle East, the role it plays in the Province [of Mozambique] and the attitude of the Portuguese authorities as regarding the issues it raises.

P. de Beaumont complained about the complete lack of studies on Islam in the Mozambican region, noticing the ‘amazing ignorance’ that characterised its state of the art, which wavered between the utmost contradictory opinions: some authors declared that Islam was expanding more and more, others thought it was experiencing an accentuated regression, and others still asserted its total decomposition. In fact, only in 1958 was the first study entirely dedicated to the impact of Islam on Portuguese colonies published in Portugal.​[5]​ It was, to say the least, considerably flawed as a piece of scholarship, being mainly based on secondary sources and tainted by the most pedestrian prejudices about ‘pan-Islamism’ and ‘threatening Muslims’. One had to wait for the mid-1960s, when the colonial wars were already full-blown, to see the questions that the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs was asking about Islam in Mozambique being addressed in a thorough manner by Portuguese authorities. 
In 1957, however, the knowledge available was depressively scarce, as P. de Beaumont recognised. The Portuguese administration being solely interested in discriminating between ‘civilised’ and ‘non-civilised’ people, its statistics were imprecise and deceitful. Although local governors suggested a number close to a million of Mozambican Muslims, the French Consul preferred a more conservative estimate. He considered that if 400,000 to 600,000 natives were basically Muslim, there were 300,000 to 400,000 that cherry-picked from Islam what they thought fit to fulfil a psychic need that had barely a connection to the doctrinaire core of such a religion. 
After mapping the areas of Mozambique that presented a stronger Islamic hold, P. de Beaumont assessed the degree of its ‘purity’, only to conclude that in the last twenty years of the nineteenth century Mozambican Islam had been cut from Arab centres, becoming more and more isolated and left to all kinds of hybridism with the ‘animist’ culture widespread among the Makua, the largest Islamised ethnic group in Mozambique. For the French Consul, the working system forced upon Africans under the Portuguese colonial order did nothing to overcome their isolation as Muslims. As far as he could tell, no native had been able to travel to Mecca or visit the El Azhar University in the years preceding the writing of his report. The best a Mozambican Muslim could do to improve his Islamic knowledge was to attend a Qur’anic school in Zanzibar.  
It is not surprising that the traits of ‘black Islam’ made their appearance in P. de Beaumont’s text: ‘An impure Islam, an Islam of calendar, of festivities, of dress-up, in which animist and Islamic rituals, matriarchy and patriarchate, are closely intertwined’. These were common-places derived from an orientalist view impervious to any kind of plurality that did not conform to a unified and crystallised format imposed on Islamic religion and culture. According to this approach, most of the forms Islam took in Africa could not be anything but ‘bastardised’, i.e. ‘non-authentic’. The Portuguese appropriation of this view, while using a paternalistic tone typical of colonialist rhetoric, was all too happy to paint a caricature of an African ‘false’ Islam entirely devoted to an artificial facade– an artificiality that seemed even more ‘ludicrous’ as it was unable to hide the ‘true’ and ‘childish’ nature of the Negro.​[6]​ This conception of African devotees to Islam, seen as not exactly Muslims but ‘Islamised’, had a direct impact on some of the policies that were adopted to rule the Muslim communities in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, the two Portuguese colonies where Islam held a more powerful presence.
The assessment P. de Beaumont made of the power displayed by the Catholic church in Mozambique, compared to the strength of Islam, painted a picture not as unproblematic or simple as the one delivered by Bogaers. In spite of the privileged position that Catholicism enjoyed under Oliveira Salazar’s regime, the resources that the missionaries themselves mustered were still insufficient, a handicap that mirrored the chronic logistical and financial failure of the Portuguese state and its colonial ‘empire’. Besides this flaw, P. de Beaumont also pointed to the low intellectual level of the Catholic clergymen and their utter ignorance of everything that concerned the Islamic culture. Once again, only in the late 1960s was this trend to know improvement. But even then the ‘reformers’ had to confront the hostility of their conservative peers, when it was already too late for the Portuguese to preserve any possible sway over African areas.  

I
In the 1950s, a decade before the outbreak of colonial wars in the Portuguese territories in Africa, Islamophobia was recurrent in official and non-official discourses among those responsible for political and colonial affairs. Many thought that Muslims would be the main actors in triggering the anti-colonial wave in ‘Portuguese Africa’. No wonder then that Islamic communities stood out in the reports issued by the Portuguese Armed Forces, as well as the intelligence service and the political police that operated in Mozambique. Immediately before the beginning of the colonial war, local Muslims were seen as a cultural threat that undermined any success Christianity could claim. In the early years of military struggle – Frelimo having launched its first guerrilla attacks on 25 September 1964 –, the agents of the colonial staff deemed Islam a major ‘subversive’ force. The Portuguese political police, commonly known as PIDE (International Police for the Defence of the State) – a repressive instrument that was crucial both for the Portuguese dictatorship and for the war effort against nationalist movements –, arrested, questioned and sometimes brutally murdered several Muslim dignitaries, mualimos and xehes.​[7]​ Their recorded depositions attested their ‘subversive’ activities. For instance, one xehe, supposedly under the orders of Megama, described as ‘ruler of all rulers’, was accused of addressing the following speech to several other Muslim dignitaries assembled after a religious ceremony: ‘This land shall be ours. Soon, people will come from Tanganyika to expel the Portuguese whites. You, in your mosques, must spread this news to our faithful, so that all of them will unite to that people in order for us to win the victory’.​[8]​ The ‘ruler of all rulers’ was Abdul Kamal-Megama, who led a branch of a very influential Islamic brotherhood, the Qadiriyya Sadat, in Mecufi, on the southern coast of Cabo Delgado district. Curiously, a few years earlier he had been one of the first Muslims to be chosen by the administration in a preliminary attempt at establishing friendly ties to the Islamic leadership: by 1962, the authorities sponsored his pilgrimage to Mecca. Later, however, given the accusations that were being raised against him, the Portuguese political police suspected Megama of having a secret connection to the anticolonial movement, which led to his imprisonment in 1965. Megama ended up being sent to the prison at Ibo, one of the harshest in Mozambique, where he died in early 1966.​[9]​ 
Another mualimo was indicted for distributing Irisses – copies of the Qur’an that were used as talismans –, alleging that he knew the day when Nyerere would arrive and that these amulets would protect their bearers from bullets fired by Portuguese troops.​[10]​ It is interesting to note the focus on Tanganyika (later Tanzania). Portuguese administration was growing worried about the coming independence of this region, among other reasons because the Islamic element there could jeopardize the overall stability of the colonial order in Mozambique. At least this was the warning foreshadowed in a confidential report written in 1959 by the anthropologist Jorge Dias and his research team, during their mission to study the ethnic minorities in Portuguese ‘overseas’ territories.​[11]​ The first months of combat, after the upsurge of Frelimo action in the north, witnessed an intense circulation of messages and people across the border that divided Mozambique and Tanganyika, suggesting ethnic ties that were overcoming those borders and could coalesce into a united anti-colonial front.​[12]​ 
Be that as it may, by October-November 1964 Portuguese documents were almost unanimous in stressing the commitment of the Islamic hierarchy to the anti-colonial insurgency, particularly in the district of Cabo Delgado, around Porto Amélia and Montepuez, not far from Mueda where the guerrillas had started the war.​[13]​ If we are to believe the dramatic tone of a political police report, issued two years later, the circumstances had since changed for the worse: 

The enemy had no trouble in establishing a prior contact with the traditional, civil and religious authorities and, through them, launching the subversion among the greater masses, workers and believers, which are easily fettered.
Following the example of the so-called ‘great native rulers [régulos]’, xehes and mualimos, open and explicit apologists of the expulsion of whites and the independence of Mozambique, the enemy coming from abroad infiltrated the area of Montepuez council, spreading its propaganda … indoctrinated followers and promoted the rebellion in the native environment.​[14]​ 

A document produced by the Services for Centralisation and Coordination of Information in Mozambique (SCCIM), in October 1966, summarised this perception, stating that ‘the subversion, in the districts of Cabo Delgado and Niassa, has been supported by the overwhelming majority of the Islamic leadership’.​[15]​ The explanations supplied by the authorities differed in the weight assigned to the Islamic variable in this process. Some of them thought the involvement of Muslim dignitaries was simply due to the social relevance they enjoyed among the populations, which the nationalist movement was taking advantage of, and not to any specific aspect of the Islamic religion per se.​[16]​ Others, on the contrary, suggested a special affinity between Islam and the anti-colonialist drive. Their argument was based on a theory subscribed by other European Islamologists, especially those belonging to the aforementioned French school. They identified Islam not with the traits of rigidity that are nowadays so commonly assigned to Islamic culture, but with a specific fluidity – as if Islam was a kind of plasticine religion ready to adapt itself to any cultural or political mould: ‘Islamism integrates an extraordinary plasticity, unheard of in other great religions, [a plasticity that] moulds itself perfectly to the ethnic conditions of African peoples, thus allowing for an almost perfect co-existence’.​[17]​  Thanks to this alleged ability, Islam was deemed able to provide a synthesis between different African traditional creeds, reinforcing their ‘otherness’ in contrast with ‘Western values’ and making them a powerful weapon against European colonial domination: ‘Islamism provides the ideal conditions to produce the symbiosis of tribalism and fetishism, attributing a sacred dimension to all the atavistic features of the local indigenous masses, which raises the possibility that they will be enthralled by the ideas preached by the enemy’.​[18]​
As we will see, this plasticity was double-edged and therefore ambivalent: it meant that Islam could be easily adjusted to fit the subversive movements, but on the other hand it provided an opening for manipulations in favour of Portuguese interests.

II
Before and after the onset of the struggle for independence in Mozambique, different control devices were being applied to individuals and communities specifically targeted for their Islamic affiliation. Detailed lists of mosques and mu’allims were kept; Islamic associations and brotherhoods were under surveillance; itinerant preachers were checked in their moves and speeches; correspondence between Muslims was often violated, translated and transcribed to confidential documents; and travels to other territories or returns from neighbouring countries were also subject to the surveillance mechanisms set up by the Portuguese administration.​[19]​ To implement these procedures, the intelligence services counted on a web of informants maintained by the political police, mostly recruited among the local population. All this showcased a continuum from the dictatorial repression practiced in the metropolitan Portugal and the repression applied to colonised populations. The brutality of straightforwardly repressive methods in dealing with ‘subversive’ Muslims was particularly blatant in the early years of the struggle for independence.​[20]​ 
Colonial authorities also seemed ready to exert coercion in the symbolic field whenever the visibility of Islam became too striking an object for power competition. In January 1964, an official bulletin of Milange, in Mozambique, reported that ‘the Ossemane Chief Assumane Cubualo requested authorization to display two flags of the Mohammedan religion in his village where he intended to perform his cult. Permission was denied’.​[21]​ A Muslim who took refuge in Tanganyika complained about the harassment that he and his peers suffered at the hands of the Portuguese government in Mozambique just for being ‘catechists’ of Islam.​[22]​ 
Language policy was an issue that frequently surfaced in the strategies that were being worked out. Many colonisers thought that the struggle for cultural hegemony should be fought in such domain. They were trying to cope with a problem whose roots, being old, reflected the precariousness of Portuguese rule in Africa. Complaints about the preponderance of Arabic were common among the Portuguese colonial staff since, at least, the 1930s, and Jorge Dias, in the first report he produced during his field-work in Mozambique, also stressed his concern about the spread of eastern languages in comparison to the retreat of the Portuguese tongue.​[23]​ In such a context, one can understand that, in April 1963, the Governor of the district of Mozambique commanded that teaching in ‘Mohammedan schools’, even of catechism, ‘should be exclusively carried out in the Portuguese language’.​[24]​ A note of the Educational Services of Mozambique, on 6 June 1964, suggested that mualimos should be required to have qualifications allowing them to teach Portuguese.​[25]​  Other official documents, emanating from both central powers in Lisbon and from local authorities in the colonies, including the intelligence services, insisted on the mandatory learning of Portuguese as a strategy to bring colonised populations under Portuguese guidance and to avoid their being attracted to anti-colonial propaganda. The latter was supposed to be intimately connected to Islamic indoctrination. Despite all this advice and orders, we must conclude from a report of July 1968 that the compulsory use of Portuguese was conspicuous for its failure, as Swahili was, by then, spreading even beyond the boundaries of ‘black Islam’, causing ‘serious problems to the dissemination of Portuguese language and culture’.​[26]​
Repressive responses towards Islam on the part of the authorities were nothing new, and reflected an ingrained attitude that we can trace back to the 1930s.​[27]​ Most of the Portuguese colonial authorities, however, was well aware of their own structural inefficiencies, and knew that force was not a suitable solution to tackle with the ‘Muslim problem’. Thus an option for a cautionary strategy was hatched. In the official discourse, both in public speeches and classified documents, we find numerous instances of a circumspect approach to Muslim populations. A few years before the outbreak of the colonial wars, the Ministry of the Overseas acknowledged that it was wise not to openly confront them:

This situation seems to urge the greatest caution as concerns the religious policy to be enforced in Guinea, because the Islamised population has a higher cultural level and better fighting abilities. It thus becomes essential to try to attract the Islamised population while avoiding exerting any religious pressure upon them, a pressure that, until now, has been ineffective in respect to the goal of converting them to Christianity.​[28]​

The emergence of colonial wars in three different settings, two of them with important Muslim populations, needed this careful approach to acquire an additional depth in order to respond to a plight that was becoming more and more complex, both in the Portuguese domains and in the international field. 

III
In the mid-1960s, some key members of the army and the intelligence services operating in Mozambique had already begun paying attention to the strategic relevance of Muslims in the context of a colonial war that was still incipient. A document produced in 1967 by the SCCIM pointed to this new direction: ‘The importance of one million black Muslims among the population of the Province [Mozambique] cannot be denied, especially given the current situation; nor also the fact that they are concentrated in the north, near the foreign territories where the different Islamic and anti-colonial currents have free rein’.​[29]​ This recognition concurred with the assessments of dangers inherent to the Islamic factor, as we can see in the conclusions drawn by a Technical Commission that worked within the SCCIM:

Proven, as it is, that the subversion has been finding support among Mohammedan dignitaries to achieve its purposes, having we all reasons to admit that it aims at a general use of those structures, the Commission has concluded that there is a pressing need to define the forms and the ways by which we can mobilise the Islamic masses in the province [of Mozambique]…​[30]​  

Having failed in their attempts to compete with Islam in the religious arena, since Catholic missions did not show any significant progress, the time was ripe for another approach, one that accepted the irremovable presence of Islam and was able, at the same time, to use it to the advantage of the Portuguese. The new reasoning was even ready to discard decades of supposed expertise on Islam: ‘Apparently, the belief that Islam is de-nationalising has been proven false. Despite being under great pressure to become a sponsor of the political unity of the Muslim world, it has proved unable to destroy the sense of nationality’.​[31]​ It seemed that, after all, Islam could be construed as an opportunity for shoring up the Portuguese rule over colonised populations.
To think such a strategy through, Portuguese intelligence resorted to the conceptual dichotomy of ‘polarisation’ and ‘de-polarisation’. It meant a choice between a setting where Muslims (and other communities) were concentrated (‘polarised’) around major influential or charismatic leaders and a background where populations were much more scattered (‘de-polarised’), distributing their allegiance to different and smaller local centres. Strategists in the SCCIM were, in fact, divided between two alternatives: either to promote a ‘polarisation’ of Muslims around centres that the authorities could easily control and take advantage from, or to empower the supposed trend of Mozambican Muslims towards ‘de-polarisation’.
The second view was argued by Major Fernando da Costa Freire, one of the several directors that the SCCIM had since its inception, in 1961, until its demise in 1974. He based his argument on the assumption that the so called ‘de-polarisation’ was the main attribute of black or African ‘Islamised’ in Mozambique, who were considered to be the largest number there of faithful to Islam. Costa Freire believed this scenario hindered their unity or cohesion, raising obstacles to their mobilisation by the anticolonial movement: ‘The absence of a formal hierarchic subordination turns each element of the hierarchy into an autonomous entity, which … hampers the uprising, through subversion, of the Islamised black “masses”’.​[32]​ This document clearly asserted that the recruitment of Muslims to ‘subversive’ anti-colonial activities in Mozambique was basically done by those to whom a special dignity was ascribed because of their knowledge on Islamic matters. Costa Freire located in Tanzania the Islamic centres in which Mozambican Muslim dignitaries had been taught, and concluded that the ties formed during the teaching of a religious doctrine would easily put the former pupils under the guidance of their masters in all issues, religious as well as political. Tanzanian Islamic centres were therefore suspected of co-opting Muslims leaders in Mozambique against the Portuguese colonial rule.​[33]​ With these assumptions – the second one being shared by most of the operatives in the SCCIM, the political police and the armed forces –, Costa Freire proposed two inter-related lines for an Islamic policy enforced by the Portuguese authorities. The first one was to isolate, as much as it was possible, Mozambican Muslims from foreign centres of Islamic education. The second one was to encourage the trend to ‘de-polarisation’. I will begin by assessing this latter approach before turning my attention to the former one.
The Director of SCCIM believed that black Islamised would be as much ‘de-polarised’ as they could free themselves from consulting Muslim figures conspicuous for their expertise on Islamic themes. Autonomy should be granted to Islamised people, though not too much, lest they become emancipated not only from Muslim masters, but also from patronising colonialism: 

In order to grant the elements of the Islamic hierarchy of the province sufficient preparation for fostering de-polarisation, we do not think necessary that such preparation be high level but only that compatible with the cultural state of the ‘masses’. Left to their own crudeness, they will tend to polarisation, will be more receptive to external influences and may become de-nationalising factors.​[34]​

The final purpose was to co-opt Muslims as a barrier against foreign influences and a force to be mobilised in the war against the liberation movement. This double objective would be attained with no more than a soft training on Islamic issues, tailored to elevate the knowledge of the Islamised to such a level that they could do without being ‘polarised’ around local guides. This way the power of external Islamic centres to which the latter could be attached would also be reduced.​[35]​ Such a perspective pervaded Costa Freire’s advice concerning the idea of using the financial resources of the colonial state to sponsor a pilgrimage of carefully selected Mozambican Muslims to Mecca.​[36]​ In response to a request made with that intent, which had been presented to the Minister of the Overseas by self-appointed representatives of Islamic brotherhoods in Mozambique, Costa Freire employed the same dichotomous concepts and arguments he had previously developed. In his views, whereas ‘black Islam’ in Mozambique stood for a soft hierarchy and ‘de-polarisation’, the Islamic brotherhoods (turuq) imposed ‘a rigid hierarchic discipline’ based on the ‘spiritual and temporal power’ of a xehe, a ruler ‘whose precepts and orders must be obeyed even against the commands of the established authority in the country where they live’ – in Freire’s view, a typical example of a dangerous ‘polarisation’. One can guess the conclusion: if the Islamic brotherhoods, due to their subordination mechanisms, were structures invested with an ability to mobilise (or ‘activate’) thousands of people, Muslims that would profit from a visit to Mecca entirely sponsored by the Portuguese state should be chosen among a more ‘autonomous black sector’, in accordance to a policy geared to reinforcing ‘de-polarisation’.
Illustrative of the different lenses with which Portuguese colonisers looked at Islam, Costa Freire’s perspective on the ‘de-polarisation’ trend was not as consensual as the idea of isolating Mozambican Muslims, particularly African or ‘black’ ones, from external Islamic centres. To reach this goal, the authorities were advised to cut all bridges that could connect Mozambican black Muslims to the foreign sphere, especially to ‘Asian Islam’: ‘It is necessary to distinguish black Islam from Asian Islam, known as “monhé”, and avoid that they identify with each other’.​[37]​ As conceived by the colonial ideologues, the Asian had a superior identity in comparison to the African, and therefore measures should be taken to prevent the Muslim leadership in Mozambique from becoming ‘polarised’ around foreign (Asian) models. @
But even this idea could bear various meanings for different actors within the Portuguese colonial apparatus. For Costa Freire it basically signified a buttress of traditional or conservative behaviour of Sunni orthodoxy, believed to be the dominant branch of Mozambican Islam.​[38]​ This aim was closely related to the need of precluding the infiltration of Islamic progressive or heretic trends, which were ridden by the anti-colonial grassroots surge. Colonial authorities were haunted by these concerns even before the outbreak of war. In September 1963, for instance, the Government of Mozambique district supported a request presented by an elderly mualimo, Amad Dulá Ismael, who asked for permission to build a mosque with a Qur’anic school attached. The petitioner was a perfect representative of a traditional Sunni Islam that abided by the Portuguese colonial order. The administration sided with him in detriment of Cassimo Tayob, a former disciple of Dulá Ismael who took the control over the latter’s old school, turning it into a ‘de-nationalising’ and ‘un-Portuguese’ focus.​[39]​ At this point, Portuguese authorities seemed to be all but ignorant of wahhabism, the Islamic trend that Tayob stood for. They assumed that it conveyed a nasty ‘progressivism’, even though its stance was actually of a hyper-orthodox Islam.
And yet, it was exactly in 1963, even before his appointment as an assistant in the SCCIM, that Fernando Amaro Monteiro, recognised as the best Islamologist within the colonial staff,  began bringing to the authorities attention the perils that wahhabism could signify to Portuguese rule.​[40]​ Having emerged mainly in southern Mozambique in the late 1960s, around dignitaries who studied in Saudi Arabia, intolerant to any minor deviation from the Islamic norm, wahhabism denounced the practices of Sufi brotherhoods as unacceptable ‘innovation’ (bid’a), branding them as ‘obscurantism’ in relation to true Islam.​[41]​ Considering that the latter were precisely the kind of local Islam that Portuguese authorities were willing to privilege, it was easy to foresee the problems that the attacks and baiting led by major Wahhabi figures could introduce in the fragile balance of Mozambican cultures.​[42]​ 
In July 1968, when he returned from his Islamic studies at the University of Aix-en-Provence, Amaro Monteiro wrote a report in which he underlined the importance of counter-acting the progressivism’s expansion in Islam, a tendency that had already conquered neighbouring regions such as Sudan, Kenya and Tanzania, disrupting the old symbiosis of Islamism and fetishism, and that sooner or later would reach Mozambique.​[43]​ However, the strategy directed at insulating African Islam in Mozambique did not mean, in Amaro Monteiro’s view, the simple reinforcement of conservative orthodoxy as Costa Freire intended. The 1966 survey on Islam that Monteiro conceived to fill in the gaps of knowledge denounced by the French Consul General in 1957 allowed him to map a heterodoxy that, peculiar as it was to Mozambican Muslims, would help ‘to isolate the Islamism of the province from the external context’ and avoid its subordination to any foreign centre of power – an objective that Amaro Monteiro placed at the heart of all the initiatives that the Portuguese administration should take regarding Islam.​[44]​ Dozens of Muslim dignitaries, in regions as dispersed as Sofala, Quelimane, Nampula, Porto Amélia and Montepuez, who had been questioned on some particular details of doctrine, showed their devotion for the Virgin Mary and the Prophet Issa (Jesus Christ), and accepted, in total departure from the Qur’an, the truth of Crucifixion. Amaro Monteiro was following the example set by a major figure of the Catholic Church in Mozambique, Don Eurico Dias Nogueira, Bishop of Vila Cabral (currently Lichinga), who in 1966 addressed a Fraternal Letter to the Muslims of his diocese in which he explored shared points of doctrine between Christianity and Islam, namely the cult of the Virgin Mary.​[45]​ Bolder than Dias Nogueira, Monteiro was willing to go beyond doctrinal boundaries, for he saw in some heterodox deviances an opportunity to politically explore a cultural convergence between Islamised Mozambicans and Portuguese Christianity.
Another device to improve the segregation of colonised Islam from external influences was the establishment of a centre, duly controlled by the Portuguese administration, for the learning of Islamic religion.​[46]​ Such an idea knew different versions, stimulating a kind of competition between projects for Islamic centres – a competition inevitably crossed by cultural and political rivalries. 
To begin with, the authorities feared the void left by two major events: the death of the Shaykh Sayyid Ba Hassan, head of the Qadiriyya Sadat and Imam in Mozambique Island; and the deposition of the Sultan of Zanzibar Seyyid Jamshid bin Abdulla by an armed insurgency in 1964. Since the latter’s sway over northern Islamism in Mozambique had been structural, extending his religious sovereignty as far as the districts of Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Mozambique and even the region of Zambezia,​[47]​ colonial authorities were afraid that, in his absence, new poles could emerge inside and outside Mozambique with a hostile attitude towards the Portuguese presence. Facing this prospect, Eugénio de Castro Spranger, assistant at the SCCIM, recommended the establishment in the colony of a centre for Islamic indoctrination that could dispense with foreign dependencies.​[48]​ A version of this idea pointed to the creation of a learning centre in Mozambique dedicated to the teaching and certification of Islamic knowledge, one that could be directed by Sayyid Bakr, the prestigious khalifa that followed Ba Hassan as head of the Qadiriyya Sadat after a troublesome succession process,​[49]​ and who was wrongly given the title of Mufti in the anonymous document that conceived such possibility.​[50]​
Major Costa Freire, in turn, true to his concept of ‘de-polarising’ the Muslims, thought a single centre inconvenient and proposed instead several dispersed ones, possibly based on Qur’anic schools already existent, organised to prepare those that would integrate the future Islamic hierarchy in Mozambique – a perspective that the Governor General, an Air Force officer called José Augusto da Costa Almeida, basically reproduced in a dispatch of December 1967, fearing that a single centre for the study of Islam could become a ‘source of supra-national influences’.​[51]​ 
Another scheme dreamed of profiting from the Sultan of Zanzibar himself, who had meanwhile been granted asylum in England. The idea was to persuade him to move to Mozambique, thus giving rise to a situation where a former important centre of Islamic diffusion in the neighbouring region, built upon the prestige of the Sultan, would be relocated so that it became an entirely Mozambican one, under the discrete guidance of Portuguese authorities.​[52]​ For a while, news and rumours circulated heralding the materialisation of such perspective – an event that was never to take place.​[53]​
There was also the hidden agenda of Suleiman Valy Mamede, a Muslim born in northern Mozambique from an Indian family, founder and president of the Islamic Community of Lisbon (ICL), who acted simultaneously behind the scenes and in the forefront of public appearances. Resident in Lisbon and always surrounding himself with personalities that held some leverage over the state apparatus, Valy Mamede tried to persuade the Ministry of the Overseas to accord his ICL the status of an Islamic centre with power over all the Muslim communities of Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau – a power to be used in total agreement and collusion with the colonial policy of the Portuguese state.​[54]​ 
Valy Mamede’s project is of particular interest because it illustrates the kind of intervention a member of an ethnic and religious minority could perform in order to confront the official discourse with its never-fulfilled promises. As this discourse insisted on portraying Portuguese colonialism as a multiracial and multicultural harmony, it was to be expected that Islam and its representatives would be granted the same rights as Catholics. But the idea of an Islamic centre emerging from the initiative of a Muslim, with the ambition of having an overarching influence in the ‘Portuguese’ Islamic world, could only awoken fears and anxieties. To Monsignor Paulo Machado, a priest in Mozambique who gave free rein to Islamophobic feelings in a letter sent to the Governor General on 4 October 1967, the whole notion of creating an Islamic University in Mozambique, a project announced by the newspaper Diário de Moçambique in which he saw the signature of Valy Mamede, was nothing short of high treason to Portuguese interests.​[55]​ Even some of the local Muslim communities looked upon Mamede’s proposal disapprovingly, involved as they were in a dispute about the best place to establish the Islamic centre: in Lisbon, at the metropolitan heart of the ‘empire’, or in Mozambique? And, if in Mozambique, should it be installed in the north, where ‘black Islam’ prevailed through the Islamic brotherhoods, or in the south, where ‘Asians’ outnumbered ‘Africans’ in Muslim associations?​[56]​ 
Besides these obstacles and contradictions, one can easily guess how Valy Mamede’s intent would clash with the hyper-centralist format of the Portuguese dictatorship and its colonial system. As soon as his project and goals became plain and evident, a wall of impediments was raised by the Government General of Mozambique, the SCCIM and the Mozambican delegation of the political police. Behind that wall stood a man I have already mentioned: Fernando Amaro Monteiro.​[57]​
It happened that Amaro Monteiro also possessed a plan for implementing an Islamic centre in Mozambique, a plan he had been working on since 1965. And he was in a much better position to assure its success, and at the same time wiping out all other rival projects. 
In the first place, Monteiro knew that the Shafiiyya was the more disseminated school of Islamic law among most Mozambican Muslims. Taking into account that this school favoured the Ijma, the consensus attained by Muslim notables endowed with recognised authority in matters of faith as one of the sources of the Shari‘a (the Islamic law),​[58]​ Amaro Monteiro advised that ‘any effort of the administration to act on the communities of Shafiiyya rite … should be based on the Ijma to be efficient’. From this notion he extracted a whole plan to seduce the Muslim communities and align them with the Portuguese power: 

‘A council of notables, officially collaborating in the exegetic translation of the Hadiths and the Qur’an to Portuguese, would authenticate these versions before the eyes of the greatest majority of the believers; it would bond those notables to our administration and would help to segregate them from the foreign context, and would serve as an embryonic experimental nucleus … of what might be, later, a first centre of Islamic studies in Mozambique…’​[59]​

Devised to be composed of some 21 to 23 prestigious figures chosen among local Muslim leaders with African roots, this state-sponsored Islamic centre, which Amaro Monteiro literally called ‘Ijma’, a designation later replaced by ‘Council of Notables’, would fulfil a set of multifarious and interconnected goals:
(1) To assemble the main leadership of Mozambican Muslims in a single organ, small enough for the Portuguese authorities to easily supervise by monitoring its articulation with Muslim populations spread throughout the territory and Islamic centres outside Mozambique. 
(2) To favour and back up the more conservative or traditional elements of local Islam, as the support given to those elements would preserve the supposedly ‘cultural narrowness’ of the Islamised, preventing them to be exposed to ‘subversive’ anticolonial ideas.
(3) To separate African from Asian Muslims, avoiding that the latter, perceived as ‘more advanced’ within a racialised hierarchy, were in a position to lead the former against the Portuguese colonial grip.
(4) To promote a delusional self-esteem experience by Muslim dignitaries, expecting them to be grateful to the Portuguese administration for recognising their relevance.
(5) To publicly commit Muslims leaders in the support for the Portuguese colonial cause, attracting them into a position where they could not refuse to call the faithful to arms, i.e., a call to align with the Portuguese side of the war against Frelimo, possibly by integrating a special armed corps or militia exclusively composed of Muslims.​[60]​ 
As we will see, although he was successful in pacifying the northern Mozambican Muslims, the conditions under which Monteiro tried to implement his bold and ambitious plan of ‘psychological war’ summarised many of the contradictions and inefficiencies that would soon lead the Portuguese to a dead-end in what concerned their African colonial design.

IV
Amaro Monteiro was perfectly aware that his plan needed a thorough and detailed knowledge of the Islamic panorama in Mozambique. It was politically imperative to overcome the shortcomings described in P. de Beaumont’s report. The 1966 survey on Islam, entirely designed by Monteiro, was a tool devised to circumvent the limitations of previous questionnaires, and even to compensate the fact that its implementers would be local administrators, mostly unprepared for their job and often disclosing an appalling unawareness of the cultural landscape that surrounded them. It was the largest survey ever carried out in Mozambique, destined to cover around 700 Muslim dignitaries previously identified throughout the region, who were supposed to answer a series of questions about family structure, religious behaviour, Islamic perceptions of Christianity, and so forth.​[61]​ Although stuffed with ‘anthropological’ questions, which can actually provide a wealth of valuable information about the beliefs, traditions and social structures of Muslim communities in Mozambique at the time it was applied, the enquiry was essentially a smoke-screen to sound  for three essential pieces of information: (1) who were the most important and influential leaders of Mozambican Muslim communities; (2) what were their liaisons to foreign centres of Islamic learning and counselling; (3) what Islamised groups disclosed stronger affinities with Christianity. Behind these goals, stood the final purpose of establishing the Ijma. 
The insufficiencies of the Portuguese administrative apparatus immediately manifested in a context where swiftness was a key factor. Amaro Monteiro complained that a year and seven months after the distribution of the questionnaire many answers were still missing due to lack of personnel capable of collecting and sending them to the central services. A memo issued by Major Costa Freire on 9 February 1967 indicated that 28 administrative sectors of nine districts had still not sent the answers.​[62]​ Freire also suggested to higher instances that Amaro Monteiro should travel, in person, to several districts in order to solve the delays there and to make his first contacts with major Muslim dignitaries already identified, so that he could deepen the questioning, identify the articulations of the Islamic leadership inside Mozambique and with external centres, and study Mozambique Island as the main ‘polarising’ focus of Islam. But the sense of urgency he put in his words was to no avail. Only two years later, from January to August 1969, was Amaro Monteiro allowed to make his field-work visits to the most relevant Islamic districts of Mozambique where he finally became known as the first Portuguese to really engage with Muslim communities, something he is still remembered for, nowadays, in some northern regions of Mozambique.​[63]​  
Meanwhile, on 2 December 1968, Jacques Honoré, another French Consul General in Lourenço Marques, mentioned in one of his dispatches to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs the kind of strategy that Baltazar Rebelo de Sousa was adopting towards the Islamic populations. The first of the last three Governors Generals of colonised Mozambique, all of them civilians, Rebelo de Sousa was expecting to perform an action of great relevance regarding the Muslims. An atmosphere of suspense was deliberately created. Part of that initiative was, however, unveiled when he advertised, in a speech made on 30 November 1968 at the inauguration of the Ismaili House, that soon he would address a message to all Mozambican Muslims, whose content was supposed to extol ‘everything that unites Christians and Muslims and makes our fraternal entente easy in the cult of the one God and the service of Portugal for which all of us are fighting’.​[64]​  He accomplished this on 17 December 1968, during the Laylat ul-qadr, in a message broadcast through local radio. Always keeping a low profile and preferring to remain out of sight, it was Amaro Monteiro who stage-managed the whole process: he carefully chose the occasion, wrote the message, convinced Muslims leaders to invite the Governor as well as several prominent figures of the Portuguese colonial staff, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the Archbishop to a mosque in Lourenço Marques for the celebration of the end of Ramadan; he then instructed the Portuguese authorities on how they should behave, controlled the diffusion of the event in the local press, etc. Furthermore, after the outstanding impact the Governor’s message had on its addressees, Amaro Monteiro also advised that it should be translated so that its effect could be exploited in other Islamic regions. He suggested that the message be disseminated directly among the Islamic countries with which Portugal had diplomatic relations, and indirectly, through different diplomatic channels, to all other countries where Islam was the dominant religion. Throughout this process, Amaro Monteiro had staged what he called the ‘first measure to approach the Islamic communities of the province [of Mozambique]’​[65]​. 
Afterwards, Monteiro went even further, leading the Governor General to discretely suggest, in some of his public deliveries, that Mozambican Muslims, in their performance of the khutba (Friday prayer), could invoke the Head of the Portuguese state. Curiously, he argued as precedent that in the Islamic republics of the USSR Friday prayers already included a reference to public powers.​[66]​ In his previous research expeditions, he tried to unearth whether or not any specific name was invoked as Imam, during the khutba, to replace the Sultan of Zanzibar that used to be called for in several areas (namely in Niassa district).​[67]​ To propose the Head of the Portuguese state as a kind of surrogate ‘Imam’ was also a hint as how to solve the intricate problem of finding someone to fulfil the vacuum left by the last Imam of Mozambique Island.
In a way, Amaro Monteiro overpassed the initiative first taken by the Catholic Church, which had mobilised some of its more progressive members, such as the Bishop of Vila Cabral, to start an ecumenical dialogue with Muslim communities. Now the Portuguese strategy related to Islam was being developed, at least in Mozambique, within a triangle that articulated three major players. One was precisely the Catholic Church, whose newly discovered ‘ecumenism’ towards Islam was receiving the explicit support of the Holy See.​[68]​ The second player occupied the very core of the Portuguese political dictatorship, in the person of its head, Oliveira Salazar, who had conceded a long audience to the Bishop of Vila Cabral during which he gave his blessing to Dias Nogueira’s idea of publishing the Fraternal Letter to the Muslims.​[69]​ Finally, the third corner of the triangle corresponded to local initiatives as those Amaro Monteiro was launching. Bearing in mind the pressing demands of the colonial war, what Monteiro was really trying to do, even if deprived of certain details about the game that was being played, was to turn the triangle into a straight line, an axis consisting of the Government General and the Ministry of the Overseas – which implied excluding the Church as an undesirable nuisance, a gesture that ended up arousing hostile reactions on the part of the Catholic hierarchy. 
Despite spending all these efforts with the idea of creating the aforementioned ‘Council of Notables’, Amaro Monteiro was unable to achieve this beyond the project stage. The only part of the original scheme that was accomplished had to do with engaging 21 Muslim dignitaries in the approval of the Portuguese translation of an Islamic sacred text, a selection from the Hadiths compiled by al-Bukhari. On 15 August 1972, the publication of the final version of that text provided the opportunity for a huge display of propaganda, with a public ceremony in which the dignitaries formally signed the declaration of endorsement and recommendation to the faithful to read it, all covered in detail by the local press. Apparently, it was a great success for a policy committed to attract African Muslims, with the added gain of having a new instrument to spread the Portuguese language among the Islamized population, as Monteiro had proposed in one of his memos.   
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